Democratic Republic of Congo. Military interventions by the international community have failed to put an end to the Congolese conflict. What went wrong?
DRC Government inability to guarantee security in North and South Kivu provinces has created fertile ground for the emergence of various armed groups. In addition to violence, they engage in various illegal activities, such as the exploitation of mineral wealth. This situation, especially in the eastern provinces of the country, has lasted since 1996, the year of the fall of the thirty-year dictatorship of Mobutu Sese Seko.
Weakened by decades of kleptocratic rule and armed uprisings, the Congolese state relies on the support of regional and global players. The United Nations Peacekeeping and Stabilization Mission (MONUSCO) has been operating in the DRC for more than 20 years. As of February 2023, the United Nations force had 16,316 men and women from 62 countries acting as intervention troops, staff officers and mission experts. The East African Community (EAC) completed its deployment of troops in April 2023. As soon as they were established, the DRC asked the Southern African Development Community to “restore peace and security in the DRC Oriental”.
This revolving door of military interventions raises questions about whether the national and international actors involved really examine past failures and draw useful lessons from them. Contemporary crises often re-emerge from unresolved previous crises. This is the case of the Congo. Both of Kinshasa’s three post-Mobuto governments (Deliré Laurent Kabila, Joseph Kabila and the current one under Félix Thsisekedi) have proven short-sighted, driven by populist pressure, corruption and political calculations. The Thsisekedi government is making the M23 military-political movement the only convenient target for its actions, instead of solving its deeper and broader problems.
Many of the issues that the DRC government and other regional actors have pledged to address are well known and documented. The United Nations Peacemaker Database lists 19 agreements concluded since the Sirte Accord of 1999. This preceded negotiations to end the Second Congo War in 2003. The DRC is committed to ensuring the safety of diverse communities, resolving issues of identity, citizenship and land, to oversee the return of refugees and to a demobilization process that addresses the concerns of warring parties.
The mandate of the East African Community Force (EACRF) was formulated with this in mind. The force, in collaboration with the Congolese military and administrative authorities, was to stabilize and ensure peace in the DRC. The initial deployment of Kenyan, Burundian, Ugandan and South Sudanese troops was expected to grow to between 6,500 and 12,000 troops in eastern DRC.
The idea was to reduce tensions by imposing a ceasefire and a withdrawal of the armed groups to their initial positions. Local armed groups would be demobilized in an orderly manner through a political process that includes talks with the Congolese authorities. Finally, foreign armed groups would be repatriated. What has come to be known as the Nairobi Process framed the resolution of the M23 crisis within a larger goal of peacemaking. All national and regional armed groups active in eastern DRC would be disarmed and the emphasis was on dialogue.
None of this happened. Before long everything went wrong. None of these objectives has been achieved by the Congolese government which, paradoxically, is adopting political choices that further aggravate the already existing chronic problems. Democratic Republic of the Congo President Felix Tshisekedi has bluntly criticized the EAC force and suggested he may be asked to leave.
It appears that a comprehensive peace strategy is not an immediate priority for the Congolese authorities who have an eye on elections scheduled for December 2023 and the current president is seeking a second term. Tshisekedi’s administration has turned the fight against the M23 and its alleged supporters into a tool of popular mobilization in support of his policies. Therefore, military and diplomatic success on this front remains his priority. Unfortunately it has a very weak, corrupt and incompetent army.
The DRC authorities also announced that the United Nations peacekeepers in the country would be withdrawn by December 2023. If this happened, a power vacuum would be created in the east of the country that Kinshasa would not be able to manage, strengthening control over the territory of the armed gangs. The Congolese authorities have criticized the East African force and the United Nations mission for their reluctance to fight the M23, which is seen as nothing more than a disguised Rwandan (and sometimes Ugandan) intervention in the DRC, and as such the largest threat to Congolese territorial integrity.
Kinshasa’s counter-strategy consists in recognizing some local armed groups as resistant patriots (Wazalendo) to be officially supported in the fight against external aggression. The most striking case is the milestone political alliance with the FDLR (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda) responsible for the 1994 Rwandan genocide which has now been partially integrated into the Congolese National Army FARDC. Several public officials have expressed their support for this terrorist group which is already a business partner of former President Joseph Kabila.
“None of the triggers of the DRC’s recurring crises can be addressed in this atmosphere. It is impossible to imagine scenarios in which sustainable peace can be achieved without first addressing land rights, equal citizenship claims and inclusive governance institutions that serve the needs of the entire Congolese population. The implementation of a comprehensive strategy addressing belligerence and disarmament of all armed groups through a combined strategy of dialogue military and political, as envisioned within the Nairobi process, should be the top priority of any peace initiative. Peace among the peoples and countries of the region requires a real commitment to addressing all local, regional and international dimensions of the crises in eastern DRC.
To counter allegations by the Kinshasa government, the East African Regional Force (EACRF) says it has organized more patrols to protect civilians along the Goma-Kibumba-Rutshuru-Kiwanja-Bunagana and Goma-Sake-Kilolorwe-Kitchanga supply routes in the troubled eastern region of North Kivu. These routes have also been used by internally displaced persons (IDPs) in their gradual return to their homes following a ceasefire between the M23 rebel group and the FARDC, the Congolese military.
Last week, a meeting chaired by EACRF Commander Maj. Gen. Alphaxard Kiugu and the four troop commanders of contingents deployed under EACRF was intended to assess the security situation and progress in implementing the force’s mandate in the Joint Operational Area in North Kivu, as their area of jurisdiction is known. “The situation remains complex with multidimensional issues that need to be managed at different levels,” said Major General Kiugu. The patrols will also allow the free movement of people and goods, medical support to the local population and will create favorable conditions for humanitarian agencies to offer aid to the affected population.
However, the situation remains risky as there are sporadic clashes between various armed groups, a situation which is aggravated by the persistent tensions between the M23 and the Congolese FARDC army. In its latest statement, M23 accused the local FARDC army of provoking it to war by sending agents to its territory, but reaffirmed its commitment to the peace process and direct negotiations with the DRC government.
“The M23 will defend itself against any warmongering initiatives by the DRC government and will continue to ensure the protection of the population in the areas under its control,” said M23 political spokesman Lawrence Kanyuka. This is as East African Community mediators try to restart a new round of peace talks with both the government and armed groups as it seeks to get them to lay down their arms and move to a designated cantonment site.
